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B Additional Material
B.1 Model Uncertainty
In the main text, we assumed that there is a unique conjecture about the behavioral
model, while it may be more appropriate to assume that the regulator considers a number
of different models possible. We can replace the assumption of a unique behavioral model
by the assumption that the regulator considers any distortion function d ∈ D possible,
where D is a given set of conjectures. For instance, there could be uncertainty about the
aspiration level of a satisficer, or one of the models in D could be the rational agent.1 As
a consequence, we no longer have to learn about the welfare preference only, but about
the pair (d,) ∈ D × P of the distortion function and the welfare preference.2
Let Λ¯(d,) = {(d(, f), f) | f ∈ F} denote the maximal data set generated by
the pair (d,). Then the set of pairs (d,) that are consistent with data set Λ is
DP(Λ) = {(d,) | Λ ⊆ Λ¯(d,)}. We again assume that DP(Λ) is non-empty, i.e.,
at least one conjecture is not falsified by the data. Once we have narrowed down the
set of model-preference pairs to DP(Λ), we obtain the equivalence class of frame f by
[f ]Λ = {f
′ | d(, f) = d(, f ′), ∀(d,) ∈ DP(Λ)}. We can then modify our definition of
the binary nudging relation in a natural way, taking into account that both model and wel-
fare preference are unknown. In particular, for any [f ]Λ 6= [f
′]Λ we define [f ]Λ N(Λ) [f
′]Λ
if for each (d,) ∈ DP(Λ) it holds that c(d(, f), S)  c(d(, f ′), S) for all non-empty
S ⊆ X , so that for each remaining behavioral model the agent’s choices under frame f
are better than under f ′, no matter which of the welfare preferences that are consistent
with the behavioral model and the data set is the true one.
We are again interested in the existence of an optimal nudge. By the same reasoning
as in Section 3.2 of the main text, we consider maximal data sets only. An immediate
extension of Definition 2 could require identifiability of  in d, for a given pair (d,).
This property is in fact necessary but no longer sufficient for the existence of an optimal
nudge. It rules out that the maximal data set Λ¯(d,) could have been generated by a
different welfare preference ′ and the same model d, but it does not rule out that it could
have been generated by a different welfare preference ′ and a different model d′. Since
two behaviorally equivalent model-preference pairs (d,) and (d′,′) can have different
normative implications (see e.g. Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2008; Bernheim, 2009; Masatlioglu
et al., 2012), identifiability in the extended setting must aim at all aspects of the pair
(d,) that are normatively relevant.
1It is central to the idea of asymmetric paternalism (Camerer et al., 2003) that there are different
types of agents, some of which are rational and should not be restricted by regulation.
2We continue to assume that there is a non-distorting frame for each pair (d,), which will typically
depend both on the model and on the welfare preference.
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Definition 6 Pair (d,) is virtually identifiable if for each (d′,′) ∈ D×P with ′ 6=,
there exists f ∈ F such that d(, f) 6= d′(′, f).
Virtual identifiability implies that the welfare preference  is known for sure once
the maximal data set has been collected. It still allows for some uncertainty about the
behavioral model, but only to the extent that we may not be able to predict the behavior
of an agent with a different welfare preference ′ 6=.
Proposition 6 With model uncertainty, G(Λ¯(d,)) is non-empty if and only if (d,) is
virtually identifiable.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 and therefore omitted.
We can have multiple models with identifiable preferences each, that, if considered
jointly, do not have virtually identifiable model-preference pairs. Model uncertainty of
this type poses a fundamental new problem to nudging. On the other hand, adding a
rational agent to any given behavioral model with identifiable preferences always preserves
the property of virtually identifiable model-preference pairs.
B.2 Imperfectly Observable Frames
In the main text, we assumed that frames are perfectly observable and controllable by
the regulator. Since a frame can be very complex, this assumption deserves to be relaxed.
The generalization also allows us to model internal states that affect the agent’s choices.
For instance, consider a satisficing model in which the aspiration level k fluctuates in a
non-systematic and unobservable way, as in the original RS model. We can capture this
by including the aspiration level into the frame (k affects choice but not welfare), but the
extended frame cannot be fully observable and controllable for an outsider.
Imperfect observability can be modelled as a structure Φ ⊆ 2F with the property that
for each f ∈ F there exists φ ∈ Φ with f ∈ φ. The interpretation is that the regulator
observes only sets of frames φ ∈ Φ and does not know under which of the frames f ∈ φ
the agent was acting. The example with a fluctuating aspiration level can be modelled
as F = P × {2, . . . , mX} and Φ = {φp | p ∈ P} for φp = {(p, k) | k ∈ {2, . . . , mX}}.
A behavioral data set is a subset Λ ⊆ P × Φ, where (′, φ′) ∈ Λ means that the agent
has been observed behaving according to ′ when the frame must have been one of the
elements of φ′. Thus a welfare preference  is consistent with Λ if for each (′, φ′) ∈ Λ
we have ′= d(, f ′) for some f ′ ∈ φ′, so that  might have generated the data set from
the regulator’s perspective. The set of welfare preferences that are consistent with Λ is
P (Λ) = { | Λ ⊆ Λ¯()}, where Λ¯() = {(d(, f), φ) | f ∈ φ ∈ Φ} is again the maximal
data set for . Note that a non-singleton set of frames φ can appear more than once
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in a maximal data set, combined with different behavioral preferences. This also implies
that the cardinality of Λ¯() is no longer the same for all  ∈ P , because two different
frames f, f ′ ∈ φ might generate two different observations for some preference but only
one observation for another preference.
In many applications, such as a satisficing model with fluctuating aspiration level, it
is reasonable to assume that the same Φ applies to observing and nudging, i.e., the frame
dimensions that the regulator can observe are identical to those that he can control. We
allow for the more general case where a set of frames can be chosen as a nudge from a
potentially different structure ΦN .
3 When comparing two elements φ, φ′ ∈ ΦN , we will
not necessarily want to compare the agents’ choices under each f ∈ φ with her choices
under each f ′ ∈ φ′. For instance, we want to compare orders of presentation for each
aspiration level separately, not across aspiration levels. To this end, we introduce a set H
of selection functions, which are functions h : ΦN → F with the property that h(φ) ∈ φ.
The elements of H capture the comparisons that we need to make: when comparing φ
with φ′ we compare only the choices under the frames h(φ) and h(φ′), for each h ∈ H . In
the satisficing model we would have one hk ∈ H for each aspiration level k ∈ {2, . . . , mX},
defined by hk(φp) = (p, k). The only assumption that we impose on H is that for each
f ∈ φ ∈ ΦN there exist h ∈ H such that h(φ) = f . We can then define the equivalence
class [φ]Λ = {φ
′ | d(, h(φ′)) = d(, h(φ)), ∀(h,) ∈ H × P (Λ)} for any Λ and φ. As
before, for any [φ]Λ 6= [φ
′]Λ, let [φ]ΛN(Λ)[φ
′]Λ if for each (h,) ∈ H × P (Λ) it holds that
c(d(, h(φ)), S)  c(d(, h(φ′)), S), for all non-empty S ⊆ X .
Let G(Λ) = {φ | [φ]ΛN(Λ)[φ
′]Λ for all [φ
′]Λ 6= [φ]Λ} be the set of optimal nudges. We
again consider maximal data sets. An immediate extension of Definition 2 could require
that for each ′ 6= there exists f ∈ φ ∈ Φ such that d(, f) 6= d(′, f). This property
turns out to be necessary but not sufficient for G(Λ¯()) to be non-empty. It implies
that the maximal data set for  is different from the maximal data set for every other
preference, so that  is identified once Λ¯() has been collected and once it is known that
this set is indeed maximal. Unfortunately, the cardinality of Λ¯() no longer carries that
kind of information, as we could have Λ¯() ⊂ Λ¯(′) for some ′ 6=. Upon observing
Λ¯() we then never know if we have already arrived at the maximal data set for , or
if there is an additional observation yet to be made. Our notion of identifiability in the
setting with imperfectly observable frames must therefore ensure that the maximal data
set reveals itself as maximal.
3In continuation of our previous approach, we assume that for each  ∈ P there exists φ ∈ ΦN such
that d(, f) =  for all f ∈ φ. This implies that nudging is not per se impeded by the lack of control over
frames. The assumption is clearly much stronger here than before. For instance, it holds in the described
satisficing application when there is perfect recall (because the order of presentation that coincides with
the welfare preference is non-distorting for all possible aspiration levels) but would not hold with no recall
(because the non-distorting order of presentation then depends on the aspiration level).
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Definition 7 Welfare preference  is potentially identifiable if for each ′ ∈ P with
′ 6=, there exist f ∈ φ ∈ Φ such that d(, f) 6= d(′, f ′) for all f ′ ∈ φ.
When frames are not directly observed, identifiability requires more than the existence
of a frame f ∈ φ ∈ Φ that distinguishes between  and ′. We can exclude welfare
preference ′ as a candidate only if the observed distorted preference d(, f) could not
as well have been generated by ′ for any other f ′ ∈ φ. For instance, no preference is
potentially identifiable in the perfect-recall satisficing model with fluctuating aspiration
level.4
Proposition 7 With imperfectly observable frames, G(Λ¯()) is non-empty if and only if
 is potentially identifiable.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 and therefore omitted.
We use the term potential identifiability because there is no guarantee that we will
ever be able to collect Λ¯(). Even if the agent is exposed repeatedly to a set of frames φ,
it can still happen that a specific element f ∈ φ does not materialize. This is in contrast
to the case of observable frames, where a maximal data set can always be collected in
exactly mF steps.
B.3 Complexity
In this appendix, we focus attention on models with identifiable welfare preferences, for
which knowledge of an optimal nudge is guaranteed once a maximal data set has been
observed. However, collecting a maximal data set requires observing the agent under all
mF frames, which might be beyond the regulator’s means. We are thus interested in
optimal data gathering procedures and the required quantity of information. The idea
is that a regulator, who ultimately seeks to impose the optimal nudge, is also able to
impose a specific sequence of frames on the agent, with the goal of eliciting the necessary
information efficiently.
For each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , mF}, let
Lt = {Λ|P (Λ) 6= ∅ and |Λ| = t}
be the collection of data sets that do not falsify the behavioral model and contain exactly
t observations, i.e., observations for t different frames. In particular, L0 = {∅} and LmF
4To see why, note that two preferences which coincide except for the ranking of the two top alternatives
are behaviorally equivalent for every order of presentation and every aspiration level k ≥ 2. This was
different if we allowed the agent to be sometimes rational (k = 1) as in the original RS model, in which
case all preferences are potentially identifiable.
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consists of all maximal data sets, i.e., those data sets that the regulator may end up with
after observing the agent under all possible frames. Then L = L0 ∪ L1 ∪ . . . ∪ LmF−1 is
the collection of all possible data sets except the maximal ones. An elicitation procedure
dictates for each of these data sets a yet unobserved frame, under which the agent is to
be observed next.
Definition 8 An elicitation procedure is a mapping e : L→ F with the property that, for
each Λ ∈ L, there does not exist (, f) ∈ Λ such that e(Λ) = f .
A procedure e starts with the frame e(∅) and, if the welfare preference is , generates
the first data set Λ1(e,) = {(d(, e(∅)), e(∅))}. It then dictates the different frame
e(Λ1(e,)) and generates a larger data set Λ2(e,) by adding the resulting observation.
This yields a sequence of expanding data sets described recursively by Λ0(e,) = ∅ and
Λt+1(e,) = Λt(e,) ∪ {(d(, e(Λt(e,))), e(Λt(e,)))},
until the maximal data set ΛmF (e,) = Λ¯() is reached. Hence all elicitation procedures
deliver the same outcome aftermF steps, but typically differ at earlier stages. A procedure
does not use any exogenous information about the welfare preference, but the frame to
be dictated next can depend on the information generated endogenously by the growing
data set.5
We now define the complexity n of the nudging problem as the number of steps that
the quickest elicitation procedure requires until it identifies an optimal nudge for sure.
Formally, let
n(e,) = min{t | G(Λt(e,)) 6= ∅}
denote the first step at which e identifies an optimal nudge if the welfare preference is .
Since this preference is unknown, e guarantees a result only after max∈P n(e,) steps.
With Π denoting the set of all elicitation procedures, we have to be prepared to gather
n = min
e∈Π
max
∈P
n(e,)
data points before we can nudge successfully.
To illustrate the concepts, we first consider the limited search model (assumingmX ≥ 3
to make all preferences identifiable). The following result shows that learning and nudging
are relatively simple in this model.
5Notice that an elicitation procedure dictates frames also for pre-collected data sets that itself never
generates. We tolerate this redundancy because otherwise definitions and proofs would become substan-
tially more complicated, at no gain.
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Proposition 8 For any mX ≥ 3, the limited search model satisfies
n =
{
3 if k = mX/2 and k is odd,
2 otherwise.
Proof. We assume k ≤ mX/2 throughout the proof, as cases where k > mX/2 can be
dealt with equivalently by reversing the role of the first page f and the second page X\f
of the search engine.
Case 1: k even. We first construct an elicitation procedure e and then show that it is
optimal. Let e(∅) = f1 be an arbitrary subset f1 ⊆ X with |f1| = k. Now fix any welfare
preference . The procedure then generates a data set Λ1 = {(1, f1)} ∈ L1, where
1 agrees with  within the sets f1 and X\f1. Let ai denote the alternative ranked at
position i within the set f1 by 1, for each i = 1, . . . , k. Let bi denote the alternative
ranked at position i within the set X\f1 by 1, for each i = 1, . . . , k, . . . , mX − k. Then
construct the frame e(Λ1) = f2 as f2 = {a1, . . . , ak/2, bk/2+1, . . . , bk}. The procedure then
generates a data set Λ2 = {(1, f1), (2, f2)} ∈ L2, where 2 agrees with  within the
sets f2 and X\f2. This construction is applied to all the data sets Λ1 that are generated
by the elicitation procedure for some welfare preference. The elicitation procedure can be
continued arbitrarily for all other data sets.
Let  be an arbitrary true welfare preference. We claim that the set Tk() of top k
alternatives according to  can be deduced from the generated Λ2, so that the optimal
nudge is identified and n(e,) ≤ 2 follows. Observe first that none of the alternatives
bk+1, . . . , bmX−k (if they exist) can belong to Tk(), because Λ1 has already revealed that
each b1, . . . , bk is preferred by . Now suppose that bk 2 a1 holds. We then know that
bk  a1 and thus Tk() = {b1, . . . , bk}. Otherwise, if a1 2 bk holds, we know that a1  bk
and thus bk /∈ Tk() but a1 ∈ Tk(). In this case we can repeat the argument for a2 and
bk−1: if bk−1 2 a2 we know that bk−1  a2 and thus Tk() = {b1, . . . , bk−1, a1}; otherwise,
if a2 2 bk−1 holds, we know that a2  bk−1 and thus bk−1 /∈ Tk() but a2 ∈ Tk().
Iteration either reveals Tk() or arrives at ak/2 2 bk/2+1, which implies ak/2  bk/2+1. In
this case, we know that Tk() consists of a1, . . . , ak/2 and those k/2 alternatives that 2
and hence  ranks top within X\f2.
Since  was arbitrary, we know that max∈P n(e,) ≤ 2. Obviously, no single ob-
servation ever suffices to deduce Tk(), neither in the constructed procedure nor in any
other one, hence we can conclude that n = 2.
Case 2: k odd and k < mX/2. The construction is the same as for case 1, except that
f2 = {a1, . . . , a(k−1)/2, b(k+1)/2+1, . . . , bk, bk+1}, where bk+1 exists because k < mX/2. The
arguments about deducing Tk() are also the same, starting with a comparison of a1 and
bk, except that the iteration might arrive at a(k−1)/2 2 b(k+1)/2+1, in which case Tk()
consists of a1, . . . , a(k−1)/2 and those (k+1)/2 alternatives that 2 ranks top within X\f2.
6
Supplemental Material for: Jean-Michel Benkert, Nick Netzer. 2018. "Informational Requirements of Nudging." 
Journal of Political Economy 126(6). DOI: 10.1086/700072. 
Case 3: k odd and k = mX/2. The construction is the same as for case 1, except that
f2 = {a1, . . . , a(k+1)/2, b(k+1)/2+1, . . . , bk}. The arguments about deducing Tk() are also
the same, starting with a comparison of a1 and bk, except that the iteration might arrive at
a(k−1)/2 2 b(k+1)/2+1. In this case, we can conclude that Tk() consists of a1, . . . , a(k−1)/2,
plus either a(k+1)/2 or b(k+1)/2 but never both, and those (k − 1)/2 alternatives that 2
ranks top among the remaining ones in X\f2. Hence there exist welfare preferences 
for which e does not identify Tk() after two steps. Since the missing preference between
a(k+1)/2 and b(k+1)/2 can be learned by having e(Λ2) = f3 satisfy {a(k+1)/2, b(k+1)/2} ⊆ f3,
we know that n ≤ 3.
It remains to be shown that n > 2. Fix an arbitrary elicitation procedure e and
denote e(∅) = f1 = {a1, . . . , ak} and X\f1 = {b1, . . . , bk}, where the numbering of the
alternatives is arbitrary but fixed (remember that k = mX/2). Let 1 be the preference
given (in ranking notation) by a1 . . . ak b1 . . . bk, and consider the data set Λ1 = {(1, f1)}
and the subsequent frame e(Λ1) = f2. Since k is odd, it follows that at least one of the
pairs {a1, bk}, {a2, bk−1}, . . . , {ak, b1} must be separated on different pages by f2, i.e., there
exists l = 1, . . . , k such that al ∈ f2 and bk−l+1 ∈ X\f2 or vice versa. Depending on the
value of l, we now construct two welfare preferences ′ and ′′. If l = 1, let
′: b1 . . . bk−1 bk a1 a2 . . . ak,
′′: b1 . . . bk−1 a1 bk a2 . . . ak.
If l = 2, . . . , k − 1, let
′: a1 . . . al−1 b1 . . . bk−l bk−l+1 al al+1 . . . ak bk−l+2 . . . bk,
′′: a1 . . . al−1 b1 . . . bk−l al bk−l+1 al+1 . . . ak bk−l+2 . . . bk.
If l = k, let
′: a1 . . . ak−1 b1 ak b2 . . . bk,
′′: a1 . . . ak−1 ak b1 b2 . . . bk.
For the two constructed welfare preferences ′ and ′′, the elicitation procedure first
generates the above described data set Λ1. Subsequently, it generates the same data set
Λ2 = {(1, f1), (2, f2)}, because 
′ and ′′ differ only with respect to al and bk−l+1,
which is not revealed by frame f2. Since Tk(
′) 6= Tk(
′′), it follows that n(e,′) > 2,
which implies max∈P n(e,) > 2. Since e was arbitrary, it follows that n > 2.
The nudging complexity is surprisingly small for the limited search model. In partic-
ular, the complexity is not growing in the number of alternatives. This begs the question
to what extent the limited search model is representative for more general models. It
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obviously always holds that n ≤ mF if all welfare preferences are identifiable, but the
number of frames mF can be extremely large (see footnote 13 in the main text). We
therefore derive a tighter bound on n next. The result will rest on the insight that there
is always an elicitation procedure that guarantees a reduction of the set of possible welfare
preferences at each step. Since there are mX ! different welfare preferences that the agent
might have ex ante, an elicitation procedure that reduces the set of possible preferences
at each step guarantees identification of the preference and the optimal nudge after at
most mX ! − 1 steps. It turns out that this bound is tight, because there are models for
which it is reached.
Proposition 9 Any behavioral model with identifiable preferences satisfies n ≤ mX !− 1,
and there exist models with n = mX !− 1.
Proof. The result follows immediately if mX = 2. Hence we fix a set X with mX ≥ 3
throughout the proof. We denote m = mX ! for convenience.
Step 1. We first derive the upper bound mX ! − 1. Consider an arbitrary behavioral
model, given by F and d, with mF ≥ m and identifiable preferences. Define
nˆ(e,) = min{t | P (Λt(e,)) = {}}
as the first step at which procedure e identifies , and let
nˆ = min
e∈Π
max
∈P
nˆ(e,).
It follows immediately that n ≤ nˆ, because P (Λt(e,)) = {} implies G(Λt(e,)) 6= ∅.
We will establish the inequality nˆ < m.
Consider any e and suppose nˆ(e,) ≥ m for some  ∈ P . Since |P | = m, there must
exist k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m− 2} such that
P (Λk(e,)) = P (Λk+1(e,)).
Denoting e(Λk(e,)) = f˜ and d(, f˜) = ˜, we thus have Λk+1(e,) = Λk(e,)∪{(˜, f˜)}
and d(′, f˜) = ˜ for all ′ ∈ P (Λk(e,)). We now define elicitation procedure e
′ by
letting e′(Λ) = e(Λ), except for data sets Λ ∈ L that satisfy both Λk(e,) ⊆ Λ and f 6= f˜
for all (, f) ∈ Λ, which includes Λ = Λk(e,). For those data sets, we define
e′(Λ) =
{
e(Λ ∪ {(˜, f˜)}) if |Λ| ≤ mF − 2,
f˜ if |Λ| = mF − 1.
Note that e′ is a well-defined elicitation procedure. First, Λ∪{(˜, f˜)} ∈ L holds whenever
the first case applies, because ∅ 6= P (Λ) ⊆ P (Λk(e,)) and Λ does not yet contain an
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observation of f˜ . Second, the first case then applies repeatedly because e(Λ∪{(˜, f˜)}) 6=
f˜ , so that e′ only dictates yet unobserved frames.
Consider any ′ /∈ P (Λk(e,)), so that (1, f) ∈ Λk(e,
′) and (2, f) ∈ Λk(e,)
with 1 6=2 for some f . From Λk(e,
′) ⊆ Λt(e,
′) and thus Λk(e,) * Λt(e,′) for all
t ≥ k, it follows that preference ′ is unaffected by the modification of the procedure, i.e.,
Λt(e
′,′) = Λt(e,
′) for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , mF}, so that nˆ(e
′,′) = nˆ(e,′). Now consider
any ′ ∈ P (Λk(e,)), including 
′=. Then Λt(e,) = Λt(e,
′) = Λt(e
′,′) holds for
all t ≤ k. For k < t ≤ mF − 1, the definition of e
′ implies that Λt(e
′,′) does not contain
an observation of f˜ , and that
Λt(e
′,′) ∪ {(˜, f˜)} = Λt+1(e,
′).
Thus
P (Λt(e
′,′)) = P (Λt(e
′,′) ∪ {(˜, f˜)}) = P (Λt+1(e,
′)),
so that nˆ(e′,′) = nˆ(e,′) − 1. Repeated application of this construction allows us to
arrive at an elicitation procedure e∗ for which nˆ(e∗,) < m for all  ∈ P , which implies
that nˆ < m.
Step 2. We now show that there exist behavioral models with n = mX !− 1, by giving
an example of such a model. For any ∈ P , let o() denote the opposite order of .
We write P = {1,2, . . . ,m}, where the numbering of the preferences is arbitrary but
fixed. We let F = P and number the frames such that fi = o(i). Finally, let b : P → P
be a bijective mapping such that b() /∈ {, o()}, for all ∈ P . Then the distortion
function is given by
d(, f) =
{
f if f 6= o(),
b() if f = o().
Note that each frame fi is non-distorting for a single preference only, the one with which
it coincides. This implies n(e,) = nˆ(e,) for all e ∈ Π and ∈ P , and thus n = nˆ. We
will establish the equality nˆ = m− 1.
Consider an arbitrary e. Define i1 such that e(∅) = fi1 , and ik for k = 2, 3, . . . , m
recursively such that e(Λk−1) = fik for the data set
Λk−1 =
k−1⋃
j=1
{(fij , fij)}.
If im is the welfare preference, then the procedure e will generate the sequence of data
sets Λt(e,im) = Λt for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m − 1}, with Λ0 = ∅. It follows from the
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definition of d that P (Λt) = {it+1 ,it+2, . . . ,im} holds for each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m − 1}.
This implies nˆ(e,im) = m−1, and hence max∈P nˆ(e,) ≥ m−1. Since e was arbitrary,
it follows that nˆ ≥ m − 1. Together with the result nˆ < m established in step 1 of the
proof, this implies nˆ = m− 1.
The tight bound on n established in Proposition 9 grows more than exponentially
in the number of alternatives. This shows that nudging may quickly become infeasible
despite the general identifiability of preferences.
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